Conglomerates Under the Microscope: The Search for Uncertainty in an Uncertain World by McGovern, William L.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 5 Volume 44, Spring 1970, Special 
Edition 
Article 46 
December 2012 
Conglomerates Under the Microscope: The Search for Uncertainty 
in an Uncertain World 
William L. McGovern 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
McGovern, William L. (1970) "Conglomerates Under the Microscope: The Search for Uncertainty in an 
Uncertain World," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 44 : No. 5 , Article 46. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss5/46 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
CONGLOMERATES UNDER THE
MICROSCOPE: THE SEARCH
FOR CERTAINTY
IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
WILLIAM L. McGOVERN*
INTRODUCTION
Numerous solutions have recently been offered to change the course of
present-day conglomerate activity. Some have suggested guidelines aimed at
either directing conglomerate mergers away from concentrated areas into
deconcentrated areas, or hopefully, encouraging conglomerate interest in
smaller companies in concentrated areas, in an effort to achieve a measure
of deconcentration. Others have suggested that conglomerates are sinful
and should be prohibited by statute under circumstances where their influ-
ence, even potentially, could be more than de minimis. Some have said not
enough is known about conglomerates to inform any antitrust action and
that, for all we know, conglomerates might be a blessing in disguise. Still
others have wearily pursued investigations in depth to discover what con-
glomerates are and whether they are good or bad. The net contribution to
an intelligent evaluation of conglomerates in our competitive system scarcely
justifies the reams of paper consumed by the various reports and guidelines.
I. ANTITRUST DIVISION GUIDELINES
On May 30, 1968, under the aegis of former Assistant Attorney General
Turner, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice issued a num-
ber of merger guidelines.1 Insofar as conglomerate mergers are concerned,
these Guidelines have been described as non-guidelines because of the tenta-
tive nature of their recommendations. 2
Having described a conglomerate merger as neither horizontal nor
vertical, the Justice Guidelines go on to indicate that the Department will
look with suspicion upon (1) conglomerate mergers involving potential
entrants; (2) mergers creating a danger of reciprocal buying; and (3) mergers
which for one or more of several reasons threaten to entrench or enhance the
market power of the acquired firm.
Respecting potential entrants, the Department indicated it would
ordinarily challenge any merger between one of the most likely entrants and
(i) any firm with approximately 25% or more of the market; (ii) one of the
two largest firms in a market in which the shares of the two largest firms
* B.A., Yale University, 1935; LL.B., Yale University, 1938. Formerly Special Assistant
to Attorney General of the United States.
1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968).
2 See generally Symposium, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. (1969) for a thorough discussion of the
Merger Guidelines.
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amount to approximately 50% or more; (iii) one of the four largest firms
in a market in which the shares of the eight largest firms amount to ap-
proximately 75% or more, provided the merging firm's share of the market
amounts to approximately 10% or more; or (iv) one of the eight largest
firms in a market in which the shares of these firms amount to approxi-
mately 75% or more, provided either (A) the merging firm's share of the
market is not insubstantial and there are no more than one or two likely
entrants into the market, or (B) the merging firm is a rapidly growing firm.3
While the foregoing criteria refer repeatedly to "likely entrants," the
Justice Guidelines maintain an eloquent silence as to what constitutes a
"likely entrant." Presumably, any company which seeks to acquire a firm in
some other market will, by that act alone, be stigmatized as a "likely
entrant."
II. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION GUIDELINES
From time to time the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued
specific industry guidelines, e.g., Vertical Mergers in the Cement Industry;4
Mergers in Food Distribution Industries; 5 Product Extension Mergers in
Grocery Products Manufacturing; 6 and Mergers in Textile Mill Products.7
In general, the FTC's guidelines tend to be more severe than the Depart-
ment of Justice Guidelines, and place much more significance on the
absolute size (independent of market share) of merging firms. The Statement
of Enforcement Policy With Respect to the Cement Industry is a representa-
tive model:
The Commission will challenge any acquisition of a ready-mixed concrete
company by any cement company in any local market where the cement
company is an actual or potential supplier, and where the acquired
concrete company is one of the top four concrete producers in the
market or purchases more than 50,000 barrels of cement annually.8
III. THE JOHNSON TASK FORCE
The Johnson Task Force (Neal Report)9 recommends specific legisla-
tion which would, in effect, prohibit a merger between any corporation with
sales exceeding $500 million per year and any leading firm in any market.
A "leading firm" is defined in the Report as a firm whose market share is
more than 10 percent in a market where the aggregate share of any four or
fewer firms is more than 50 percent, excluding, however, any firm whose
market share is not among the four largest in such market.
3 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note I (emphasis added).
4 TRADE REG. REP. 4510, at 6801 (1967).
5 TRADE REG. REP. 4520, at 6804 (1967).
6 TRADE REG. REP. 4530, at 6808 (1968).
7 TRADE REG. REr. 4540, at 6814 (1968).
8 TRADE REG. REP. 4510, at 6803 (1967).
9 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUsT [hereinafter cited as NEAL TASK
FORCE REPORT], 115 CONG. REc. 5642 (daily ed. May 27, 1969).
CONGLOMERATES UNDER THE MICROSCOPE
This lethal proposal was advanced despite the fact that the Neal Report
itself also stated that:
Preliminary FTC data show that the share of total corporate manufacturing
assets held by the 100 largest manufacturing firms has grown from 45.8%
in 1957 to 47.7% in 1967; the share of the 200 largest has increased from
55.0% to 58.7% in the same period. Thus, it is clear that mergers are not
solely responsible for the continued growth of the largest units in the
economy, and have accounted for only a minor portion of such growth.
Indeed, among the largest firms, the net effect of mergers has been to ex-
pand the size of smaller large firms relative to the top few. 10
IV. THE NIXON TASK FORCE
The Nixon Task Force (Stigler Report)" rushed into print on June
10, 1969 with a paper that was largely a diatribe against both the Justice
Department Guidelines and the Neal Report. The basic thrust of the
Stigler Report is that not enough is really known about the impact of
conglomerates to justify any intelligent guidelines or legislation. The Stigler
Report recommended a number of conferences be held to investigate con-
glomerates to the end that:
If there is a real political threat in giant mergers, then the critical dimen-
sions should be estimated. If there is no threat, the fears entertained by
critics of the conglomerate enterprises should be allayed.12
V. ArORNEY GENERAL MITCHELL'S WARNING
The Stigler Report had scarcely seen the light of day when Attorney
General Mitchell unburdened himself of some astringent views. In a speech
before the Georgia Bar Association in Savannah, Georgia, on June 6, 1969,
he warned that "The Department of Justice may very well oppose any
merger among the top 200 manufacturing firms or firms of comparable size
in other industries." 13 And he added that the Department of Justice will
probably "oppose any merger by one of the top 200 manufacturing firms of
any leading producer in any concentrated industry.' 14
VI. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
An interim economic report of the Federal Trade Commission was
presented to Congress on November 4, 1969.15 By employing different time
intervals than those adopted by the Neal Report, the Commission contended
that by the end of 1968, the 200 largest industrial corporations controlled
10 NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT 5646.
11 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION [herein-
after cited as STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT], 115 CONG. REC. 6472 (daily ed. June 16, 1969).
12 STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT 6476.
1 Address by John N. Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States, in 115 CONG.
REG. 6659-61 (daily ed. June 18, 1969).
14 Id.
15 BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969) [here-
inafter cited as FTC REPORT].
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over 60 percent of the total assets held by all manufacturing corporations.16
Specifically, the share of manufacturing assets held by the hundred largest
corporations in 1968 was greater than the share of manufacturing assets held
by the 200 largest manufacturing corporations in 1950.17 The 200 largest
manufacturing corporations in 1968 controlled a share of assets equal to that
held by the thousand largest in 1941.18 Since World War II practically all
of the increases in the share of industrial assets held by the 200 largest cor-
porations were directly attributable to mergers. 19
In essence, the FTC Report recommended that the Commission and the
Antitrust Division announce forthwith the following mergers as likely to
violate the law:
1. When the acquiring corporation is a large enterprise having a sub-
stantial volume of sales in one or more concentrated industries. (For
this purpose a large firm is defined as having annual sales or assets in
excess of $250 million.)
2. When the acquired company is one of the leading firms in at least one
concentrated industry. (A concentrated industry is defined as one in
which the 4 leading firms account for 40 percent or more of sales. A
leading firm is one included among the 4 to 6 largest sellers in an
industry.)2 0
In transmitting the Report to Congress, Chairman Dixon described it
as merely the first phase of the Commission's study and emphasized, "the
Commission as a whole and the individual Commissioners neither neces-
sarily endorse nor adopt the report or its recommendations." 21
Commissioner Elman, who is on record for the proposition that not
enough is yet known about the baleful economic effects of conglomerates, 22
indicated the Report constituted a useful first step. However, he expressed
agreement with the view of Assistant Attorney General McLaren that the
present enforcement policy of the responsible government agencies "rejects
any notions of per se illegality .... [A] merger, even of large firms, which
does not pose a substantial competitive danger on reciprocity or other
grounds is not subject to antitrust attack."23
Commissioner Jones opposed the transmission of the Report to Con-
gress last November because:
In my opinion, the staff recommendations and many of their conclusions
are premature and not supported by the type of hard empirical data which
18 FTC REPORT 173, table 3-3.
17 Id.
18 Compare FTC REPORT 167, table 3-3 with table 3-2.
19 See generally FTC REPORT 191-98, specifically figure 3-5, at 195.
20 FTC REPORT 17.
21 Letter from Chairman Paul Rand Dixon to Hon. Phillip A. Hart, in FTC REPORT
IX.
22 Conglomerate Mergers, The Need for Investigation of the Obscure, Address by Com-
missioner Elman before the ABA Nat'l Inst., New York City, Oct. 23, 1969.
23 Id.
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is potentially available to the Commission and indeed which the Commis-
sion intends to assemble and analyze. While the report sets out a factual
description of the structural dimensions of the current conglomerate merger
movement, it relies essentially on hypothesis and theorization for its con-
clusions respecting the anticompetitive effects-reciprocity, cross-subsidiza-
tion, intimidation of new entrants and the like-which it sees as flowing
from conglomerate market structure. The staff work to date as reflected in
this report adds little supporting evidence for these hypotheses. Indeed
staff's conclusions and recommendations could have been made before this
study was initiated. In making its conclusions and recommendation, staff
is asking the Commission and the public to share its faith in the anticom-
petitiveness of conglomerate mergers, and to substitute that faith for hard
data.24
VII. THE PURSUIT OF CERTAINTY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
Since the turn of the century we have been caught up in a schizophrenic
conflict between a fear of bigness, on the one hand, and conversely, an
admiration, a secret pride, and most importantly, an overwhelming desire
for what it can produce. While we all have cursed bigness, still we are grati-
fied to have our huge industrial complex put us on the moon ahead of the
Russians.
However, the recent rash of proposed guidelines and legislative remedies
reach new heights of irrationality. Our objective is supposed to be competi-
tion, but all of our efforts have been focused upon concentration without
regard to competition. Instead of confronting the hard competitive realities
of the marketplace, we embroider upon the old symbols to produce a new
book of legal shorthand, while sidestepping the difficult task of determining
whether a particular transaction did in fact substantially diminish competi-
tion.
In 1911, the Supreme Court saved us from never-never land by pointing
out that the antitrust laws forbid only unreasonable restraints; 25 curiously,
the same Court today informs us that nearly everything that is not de
minimis is bad per se.26
Putting to one side the thought that we are rushing into an abyss of
darkness and ignorance where even angels would fear to tread, many of
the proposals with which we have been recently deluged may well be
inviting disaster rather than preserving a dynamic competitive economy.
It will be noted that all of the suggested criteria are preoccupied with
structure, almost to the exclusion of competition which is, after all, the
statutory test.27 Structure usually provides a facile handle to gain a quick
statistical picture of an industry. But structure and competition are not
necessarily proportionate. Many instances can be cited of industries that
24 Jones, Separate Statement, in FTC REPORT XIII.
258ee United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
20 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
27 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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appear oligopolistic on the surface, but upon examination disclose a com-
petitive behavior pattern that is almost suicidal. For example, a structural
test alone, would have barred the Lever Brothers-Monsanto arrangement
for the transference of the "All" trademark, even though the district court
found the transaction definitely enhanced competition in the "highly con-
centrated" soap and detergent industry.28
United States v. Lever Brothers Co. 29 demonstrates the terrible danger
of indulging uncritically in gross sales figures or of structure of the market,
or of any of the customary shibboleths of which the enforcement agencies
are so fond. In Lever it was shown that the soap and detergent industry
was highly concentrated among Procter, Colgate and Lever, the so-called
"Big-Three," but that Lever had an historically sharply declining share
which amounted to no more than 15 percent at the time of the transaction
under challenge. Monsanto, a new and reluctant entrant in the market had
acquired 5 percent. Accordingly, the Government told Judge Dawson that
15 percent and 5 percent equal 20 percent and that was that -too much.
The Judge, in effect, replied that he had learned long ago that 15 percent
and 5 percent totaled 20 percent - but 20 percent of what?
Structurally, soaps and detergents was a highly concentrated industry.
But once one examined the constituent parts of the structure and how
competition was actually waged in the industry, it became quite apparent
that it was not an industry of the "Big Three" but rather of the "Big One"
and, despite this fact, the competition could scarcely be more intense. While
structure, of course, is important, Lever demonstrates that it is only the
starting point for the searching inquiry which is incidental to the serious
appraisal of competitive strategies at work in a market that despite its static
structural appearance may be dynamic to its core.
30
It would seem obvious that if we permit industry's existing structure to
foreclose the possibility of any acquisition in that industry, we automatically
freeze the status quo and assure the present occupants of the structure that
they need not worry about competitive forays from the outside. This is the
principal vice of the Attorney General's threat to forbid any acquisition by
one of the top 200 corporations. In effect, the top 200 are assured insulation
against any other major company moving in on them. This is the necessary
effect, for example, of the Department of Justice challenging Ling-Temco-
Vought's attempt to acquire Jones &c Laughlin Steel Corp.31 Steel has long
28 See United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (the author's
firm represented Lever Bros. in this case).
29 Id.
30 This type of competitive analysis does not entail a return to trial by ordeal in the
protracted case. Lever took five court days to try, but entailed a tremendous amount of
pre-trial homework by both sides under the whiplash of an able judge who insisted upon
both sides stipulating the most controversial data.
31 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W. D. Pa., filed April
14, 1969).
The Department of Justice has four other such cases pending: United States v. In.
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been regarded as a status quo industry, suffering from hardening of the
economic arteries. Yet, apparently no company with the capability of doing
so will be allowed to move into steel with the blessing of the Antitrust
Division.
The remarkable thing about the Attorney General's top 200 corporation
test is that, while it purports to preserve "potential entrants," it actually
seems to ignore the test. It would seem obvious that if, in accordance with
Attorney General Mitchell's view, any one of the 200 or more top corpora-
tions is a potential entrant into any field, then, of course, any one of the
remaining 199 corporations is equally a potential entrant. But why worry
about a situation where there are, by definition, at least 199 bridesmaids
waiting in the wings?3 2 Similarly, if, in terms of the Neal Report, any cor-
poration enjoying more than $500 million in sales is a likely entrant, then,
as has been noted,33 there are at least 160 such firms with the same potenti-
ality- again, by arbitrary fiat of the definition used.
Perhaps the most serious defect in the top 200 test or the $250 million
gross sales test, is the utter violence such uncritical yardsticks do to the
statutory test. Since 1914, the Clayton Act has forbidden acquisitions only
"where in any line of commerce . . . the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition .... -34
To measure the validity of a conglomerate acquisition by the acquiring
company's total sales, or its ranking among the top 200 corporations, is to
aggregate the acquiring company's total (and probably very diverse) activ-
ities in a number of fields in defiance of the statutory standard of section 7
of the Clayton Act. For example, the Federal Trade Commission's recent
attack on Bendix' acquisition of Fram,35 which emphasized Bendix' total
sales of $1 billion, concealed the fact that in the principal relevant line of
commerce, the automotive after-market, Bendix' sales were only $20 million.
Such commingling of sales and assets in the whole spectrum of different
businesses necessarily renders it impossible to analyze the impact of the
acquisition on competition in a particular line of commerce.
At one time, before United States v. Philadelphia National Bank36 and
ternational Tel. & Tel. and Grinnell Corp., Civil No. 13-319 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 1, 1969);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. and Hartford Fire Ins. Corp., Civil No. 13-320
(D. Conn., filed Aug. 1, 1969); United States v. Northwest Indus. Inc. and B. F. Goodrich
Co., Civil No. 69C-1102 (N.D. Ill., filed May 21, 1969); United States v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., Civil No. 69C-924 (N.D. Ill., filed Apr. 28, 1969).
32 One likes to think that even the Supreme Court would be overwhelmed by such a
wealth of potential entrants. For a discussion of "potential entrants," see, e.g., United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964).
33 Address by Lionel Kestenbaum, before Antitrust Section, ABA, in Dallas, Texas,
Aug. 12, 1969.
34 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
351n re Bendix Corp., No. 8739 (FTC, Sept. 12, 1969). I should note, in passing, that
the law firm of which I am a partner is counsel in this case to Bendix and Fram.
36 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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A lbrech v. Herald Co. 8 7 -and before Messrs. Neal, Stigler and Mitchell -
the Supreme Court regarded each antitrust case as sui generis; each case
was decided on its own facts, and precedents afforded, at best, very little
guidance to the proper solution of the immediate problem before the
Court.8 s
CONCLUSION
In the end, we are forced back, I suggest, to the proposition that there
is no easy path to a dynamic, competitive society. A superficial look at sales
and asset statistics and market structure, is no substitute for getting out in
the marketplace and trying to find out how competition is actually waged
within an industry.
Invariably, competition has more than one dimension; there is certain
to be not only a selling side, but also a buying side, which may provide a
strong, countervailing influence. For example, however concentrated the
soap and detergent industry may appear to be, the fact of economic life is
that the industry members must sell nearly all their production through
the chain grocery field. For all of Procter & Gamble's acknowledged power
in the industry, its salesmen enter the central buying offices of the chain
supermarkets on a one-to-one basis with the competition. Then, the competi-
tive question is simply resolved, not by what position the company occupies
in its industry, but by how fast the particular products it sells move off the
precious shelf facings for which it competes. The stark fact of economic life
is that Procter needs the chain supermarkets more than the latter need
Procter.
Thus, upon stepping into the marketplace, we may find that even in
an apparently concentrated industry, the behavioral pattern is anything but
noncompetitive; we may find, even in the pundits' sense, that the woods are
full of potential entrants, and that reciprocity potentials are more than
offset by countervailing influences. We may even find that the world's largest
corporation, General Motors, with $22 billion of sales, trembles when Ralph
Nader whistles.
Such findings may well assuage our fear of bigness, per se, which seems
to be the only motivating force behind antitrust enforcement policy today.
Such findings may even serve to remind the enforcement agencies that the
preeminent object of their solicitude should be the consumer and his need
and desire for the best quality goods at the lowest possible prices. Structure
- whether in production, distribution, or retailing - is merely a means to
that end. God help us, if it should become an end in itselfl
87 390 US. 145 (1968).
88 See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 562, 579 (1925). For a
welcome return to this old principle, see Judge Duniway's thoughtful opinion in Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Inc., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969).
